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 THE LIMITS OF CULPA LEVISSIMA 
Olga Tellegen-Couperus (Tilburg) 
 
1. Introduction 
It is a well known fact that of the many thousands of texts included in the Digest only a 
few thousand are used in the study of Roman law. Among these, there are a small number 
of texts that are frequently quoted. One of these popular texts is D. 9.2.44 pr. containing 
the following sentence by Ulpian: ‘In lege Aquilia et levissima culpa venit’, ‘Under the 
lex Aquilia even the slightest degree of fault counts’. On the basis of this phrase, it is 
assumed that culpa levissima was sufficient for liability under the lex Aquilia. The 
sentence is regarded as a general rule referring to the word iniuria in that law.1 
So far, only one Romanist namely MacCormack has interpreted this phrase in a 
narrow sense by linking it with the following section, D. 9.2.44.1. Here, Ulpian states: 
‘Quotiens sciente domino servus vulnerat vel occidit, Aquilia dominum teneri dubium non 
est’, ‘Whenever a slave does a wounding or killing with his master’s knowledge, the 
master is without doubt liable under the lex Aquilia.’ According to MacCormack, there 
was only culpa levissima when a master knew that his slave was going to kill or wound 
                                                  
1 For the older literature, see J.Ch. Hasse, Die Culpa des römischen Rechts, 2nd edition revised by M.A. von 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Berlin 1838, p. 65 and E. Grueber, The Roman Law of Damage to Property, Oxford 
1886, p. 223. For the more recent literature, see, for instance, M. Kaser, Das römische Privatrecht, 2nd 
edition, Munich 1971, p. 504 with note 9; R. Villers, Rome et le droit privé, Paris 1977, p. 415; B.W. Frier, 
A Casebook on the Roman Law of Delict, Atlanta 1989, p. 40; H. Hausmaninger, Das Schadenersatzrecht 
der lex Aquilia, 4th edition, Vienna 1990, p. 25; R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, Oxford 1996, p. 1014; and A. Borkowski and P. du Plessis, Textbook 
on Roman Law, 3rd edition, Oxford 2005, p. 324. 
 2 
somebody else’s slave or animal and made no attempt to stop him.2  He published his 
view well over thirty years ago, but somehow failed to influence the current view.  
I think MacCormack was right. There are three reasons why Ulpian’s statement 
must have had only limited validity. First, it would have been a very impractical rule. It 
would have made daily life in Rome utterly impossible. Anyone could be blamed for any 
damage. Second, if such a drastic rule actually had been applied, other legal and 
particularly literary sources would have referred to it. There are none. Third, the Roman 
jurists would not have bothered so often to explain the meaning of culpa if culpa 
levissima would have been sufficient anyway. In my view, culpa levissima was not a 
general ground for liability under the lex Aquilia, but referred to the liability of a master 
for delicts committed by his slave. 
In classical Roman law, there were two clear rules about the liability of a master 
for delicts committed by his slave. The first rule was that, when the master did not know 
what his slave was going to do, he was noxally liable.3 This type of liability included the 
option of handing over the slave to the plaintiff instead of paying the penalty. The second 
rule was that, when a master had ordered his slave to commit a delict, the master was 
liable in his own name, as if he had committed the delict himself; he was directly liable 
and could only be sentenced to paying the penalty.4 Ulpian’s text deals with the grey zone 
between these two rules: what is law when a master knows what his slave is about to do 
and is able to stop him but does not do so? Should this master be put on a par with the 
master who had ordered his slave to commit a delict, or with the master who did not 
know what his slave was about to do? According to Ulpian, he was regarded as a master 
                                                  
2 According to G. MacCormack, Aquilian Culpa, in: Daube Noster. Essays in Legal History for David 
Daube, ed. A. Watson, Edinburgh-London 1974, p. 204, Ulpian discussed the problem whether the dominus 
sciens was directly liable or only noxally liable; he opted for the former. MacCormack concludes that, in 
this context, it makes good sense for Ulpian to state generally that the slightest fault is enough to incur 
liability. In the same vein, earlier but hesitatingly, S. Schipani, Responsabilità “ex lege Aquilia”. Criteri di 
imputazione e problema della “culpa”, Turin 1969, p. 445.  
3 Gaius, Inst. 4.75. 
4 Ulp. D. 9.4.2 pr. 
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who had issued the order.5 He introduced his view by remarking that, under the lex 
Aquilia, even the slightest fault counted. It is clear that his qualification refers only to the 
case of the dominus sciens. 
Six years after MacCormack published this interpretation, the subject of scientia 
domini was taken up again by another Romanist, Gimenez-Candela, who apparently did 
not know of MacCormack’s paper. She took the current view as a starting point and 
presented the following theory.6 In the lex Aquilia, scientia domini was not the scientia 
dolosa corresponding with the phrase sciens dolo malo but the scientia culposa that was 
sufficient for (direct) liability under the lex Aquilia. In other delicts, there was only 
liability if dolus was involved. There, scientia domini could not lead to direct liability. 
There, the master who ‘knew’ and could stop his slave but did not do so, was still only 
noxally liable. There are two texts by Ulpian and Paul stating that, in all noxal actions, 
scientia domini leads to direct liability. According to Gimenez, both these texts have been 
interpolated. 
About ten years ago, I also wrote a paper on the subject in Tertium datur, the third 
collection of studies in honour of Hans Ankum, but since it was written in Dutch it was 
probably not read by many people outside the Netherlands.7 In this paper, I am going to 
challenge the current view on culpa levissima once again.  
I will first deal with Gimenez’ theory on scientia dolosa and scientia culposa 
which is based on the assumption that culpa levissima was a general ground for liability 
under the lex Aquilia. Then, I will discuss Ulpian’s words in their context and I will show 
that they applied only when a master knew his slave was going to commit damnum 
iniuria datum and did nothing to stop him.  
                                                  
5 I will not deal with the question of whether scientia domini was already included in the lex Aquilia as a 
procedural clause or whether it has been elaborated by the jurists. In this connection, see M. F. Cursi, 
Iniuria cum damno. Antigiuridicità e colpevolezza nella storia del danno Aquiliano, Milan 2002, p. 218-
219. 
6 T. Gimenez-Candela, Sobre la “scientia domini” y la acción de la ley Aquilia, in Iura 31 (1980), p. 122-
123. 
7 O.E. Tellegen-Couperus, Culpa levissima en de onrechtmatige daad, in Tertium datur. Drie opstellen 
aangeboden aan Prof. Mr.J.A. Ankum, O.E. Tellegen-Couperus, P.L. Nève, and J.W. Tellegen (eds), 
Tilburg 1995, p. 89-118. 
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My conclusion will be that – as Ulpian and Paul stated – in all delicts, scientia 
domini led to direct liability of the master and that Ulpian’s sentence ‘In lege Aquilia et 
levissima culpa venit’ served only to introduce a case of scientia domini and was not 
meant to constitute a general rule. 
 
 
2. Scientia domini in Connection with Noxal Actions 
In the Digest, title D. 9.4 deals with noxal actions. Except for the very first text, the first 
part of the title is about the effect of scientia domini on noxal actions. The eight texts in 
question all stem from Ulpian and Paul. The first one is about the lex Aquilia, but the 
other seven deal with noxal actions in general, without focusing on a particular delict. In 
D. 9.4.3, Ulpian makes a general statement about  the interpretation of scientia domini in 
connection with noxal actions. I will quote the text with the translation by Kolbert in 
Watson’s edition and translation of the Digest: 
Ulpianus libro tertio ad edictum. In omnibus noxalibus actionibus, ubicumque scientia exigitur 
domini, sic accipienda est, si, cum prohibere posset, non prohibuit: aliud est enim auctorem esse 
servo delinquenti, aliud pati delinquere. 
Ulpian in book 3 on the edict. In all noxal actions, wherever knowledge on the part of the master is 
required, ‘knowledge’ must be understood to include instances where he could have prevented the 
slave but did not do so. It is, however, one thing to instigate the commission of a delict by a slave 
and quite another to allow him to commit one.8 
In the first sentence of this text, the words scientia domini are explained: a master is 
regarded as ‘knowing’ when he did not prevent his slave from committing a delict 
although he was able to do so. The second sentence is not so clear. Here, Ulpian makes a 
contrast between the master as auctor of a delinquent slave and the master who tolerates 
the actions of a delinquent slave: the words ‘aliud … aliud’ indicate that the two cases 
refer to two basically different situations.  It is clear that the words ‘pati delinquere’ in 
the second case refer to the master who knew what his slave was up to but did nothing to 
                                                  
8 The Digest of Justinian, Th. Mommsen / P. Krüger / A. Watson (eds), Vol. I, Philadelphia 1985, p. 297. In 
my view, this translation is not quite correct; first,  I would not render ‘exigitur’  by ‘is required’ but rather 
by ‘is claimed’ or ‘is investigated’; second, the words ‘auctorem esse’ cannot mean ‘to instigate’ here. 
Below, I will discuss the translation of these words. 
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stop him; they summarize the explanation of scientia domini. However, it is not quite 
clear how the words ‘auctorem esse’ in the first case must be interpreted.  
In Romanist literature as well as in the translations of the Digest, the words ‘aliud 
est enim auctorem esse servo delinquenti’ are consistently understood to refer to the 
master who orders his slave to commit a delict, the dominus iubens.9 Apparently, it is 
assumed that Ulpian makes a distinction between the dominus iubens who is directly 
liable for all delicts committed by his slave, and the dominus non prohibens who is 
directly liable because he could stop his slave but did not do so.  
One Romanist thinks that this text has been interpolated, namely Gimenez-
Candela whom I mentioned earlier.10  She also thinks that Ulpian distinguishes between 
the dominus iubens and the dominus non prohibens, but in her view it is impossible that 
he was referring to all noxal actions. Under the lex Aquilia, culpa or iniuria was 
sufficient for liability. Scientia domini was a form of culpa, although it was merely culpa 
levissima. For other delicts, dolus was required. Therefore, scientia domini was only 
relevant in connection with the lex Aquilia. In the case of other delicts, scientia domini 
did not lead to direct liability. It was only in Justinian’s time that this type of scientia, 
                                                  
9 For the translations, see C.E. Otto, B. Schilling, and K.F.F. Sintenis, Das Corpus iuris civilis (romani) ins 
deutsche übersetzt, Vol. I, Leipzig 1839 (rpt. Aalen 1984): ‘Dem Sclaven die Veranlassung zur Verbrechen 
geben’; S.P. Scott, The Civil Law, Vol. III, Cincinnati 1932 (rpt. New York 1973): ‘to cause a slave to 
commit an offence’; A. D’Ors et al., El Digesto de Justiniano, Vol. I, Pamplona 1968: ‘que autorice al 
esclavo delincuente’; and J.E. Spruit, R. Feenstra, and K.E.M. Bongenaar (eds.), Corpus iuris civilis, Tekst 
en vertaling, Vol. II, Zutphen 1994: ‘Het aanzetten van een slaaf tot het plegen van een delict’. In the new 
German translation, there is hardly a contrast between the two aliud-phrases, see O. Behrends, R. Knütel, 
B. Kupisch, and H.H. Seiler (eds.), Corpus Iuris Civilis. Text und Übersetzung, Vol. II, Heidelberg 1995: 
‘Denn es ist etwas anderes, [durch Unterlassen] verantworlichrer Urheber des Sklavendelikts zu sein als das 
Delikt nur machtlos zuzulassen’. For Romanist literature, see B. Albanese, Sulla responsabilità del 
“dominus sciens”, BIDR 3rd series 9 (1967), p. 152, and G. Tilli, “Dominus sciens” e “servus agens”, 
Labeo 23 (1977), 19. Dom. A. Mignot, Le maître complice de l’esclave aux Antilles, RHD 84 (2006), p. 
265 seems to ignore the words ‘auctorem esse’ by rendering the comparison as follows: ‘qu’une chose est 
l’acte de l’esclave délinquant, autre chose est la position du maître qui s’est borné à la non-prohibition.’ 
10 Of the older Romanists, only M. Pampaloni, La complicità nel delitto di furto (furtum ope consilio), 
Studi Senesi 16 (1899), p. 36-37 regards the words ‘in omnibus noxalibus actionibus’ as interpolated. See 
E. Levy and E. Rabel, Index interpolationum quae in Iustiniani Digestis inesse dicuntur, I, Weimar 1929, p. 
118. 
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that Gimenez qualifies as ‘dolosa’, became relevant. By adding the words ‘In omnibus 
actionibus noxalibus’, the compilers made the text applicable to all delicts committed by 
slaves.  
However, I do not think that the sentence ‘aliud enim auctorem servo delinquenti’ 
refers to the dominus iubens, nor do I think that the text has been interpolated. To begin 
with the latter: Gimenez’ interpretation is based on her theory that the Roman jurists 
distinguished between scientia dolosa and scientia culposa. However, the sources do not 
provide any evidence of such a distinction. In connection with delicts committed by 
slaves, there is only one scientia domini, that is his ‘knowing’ and being able to stop the 
slave who wants to commit a delict but taking no action. It is described in terms of non 
prohibere, pati, patientia, and so on. The words dolus and culpa are not used in this 
connection except in one case, that of culpa levissima in D. 9.2.44 pr. Moreover, it is 
rather difficult to understand a concept like ‘scientia dolosa’. It seems that the master and 
the slave are being confused. Dolus and culpa were qualifications of the deed, they 
referred to the person who committed the delict, i.e. the slave, not his master. Therefore, 
there is no point in constructing such a kind of liability in Justinian law, and, 
consequently, there is no point in assuming that this text was interpolated. The same 
holds for the other text about scientia domini in connection with noxal actions, but I will 
not discuss it here.11 
Next, I come to the phrase ‘aliud est enim auctorem esse servo delinquenti’ in the 
second sentence of D. 9.4.3. It is usually taken to refer to the dominus iubens. However, 
if that were correct, the phrase would not really fit the text. Ulpian deals with noxal 
actions in which the plaintiff claimed that the defendant knew what his slave was about to 
do. In this connection, referring to the dominus iubens does not make sense because the 
noxal action does not apply to him. Moreover, the key word of the text is scientia, 
knowledge. The words ‘auctorem esse’ will have to fit that context.  
                                                  
11 The other text is Paul. D. 9.4.4 pr. 
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I think it may help to have another look at the word ‘auctorem’. The word auctor 
usually does mean ‘instigator’, ‘Urheber’,12  but it cannot have this meaning here. If it 
were used in that sense, there would be no difference between the first and the second 
case. They would both refer to a dominus sciens. Moreover, the dominus iubens of the 
first case and the dominus non prohibens of the second case would both be directly liable. 
A second reason why ‘auctorem’ cannot be taken to mean instigator here is that, when 
used in that sense, it is always connected to a word in the genitive, for instance, auctor 
pacis, or auctor legis. In this text, it is connected to ‘servo’, therefore to a word in the 
dative. 
However, the word auctor has other meanings as well. In legal texts, it is 
sometimes used for the seller who warrants the right of possession of the thing to be sold, 
an authority.13 It is also used in other senses, for instance, supporter, witness, a person 
with a title to take action, a guarantor, and it is then connected with a word in the genitive 
or dative.14 In my view, the word ‘auctorem’ in D. 9.4.3 must also be translated in this 
sense: as the person who is legally responsible for somebody else, in this case for his 
slave. If the phrase ‘aliud enim auctorem esse servo delinquenti’ is translated as ‘it is one 
thing to be liable for a slave who commits a delict’, then it refers to a master who is only 
noxally liable and it forms a contrast to the other aliud-phrase about the master who is 
directly liable. The first part of the comparison is about the normal situation of a master 
who did not know that his slave was going to commit a delict, the second part is about the 
special situation of the master who knew but did not stop his slave from committing a 
delict. In this way, the comparison turns on the concept of knowledge and fits perfectly in 
with the first part of the text. 
This text shows that scientia domini was an element in noxal actions that led to 
the exclusion of noxae deditio as a way of limiting liability. It had nothing to do with the 
dolus or culpa that was required for the various delicts.  
                                                  
12 See C.T. Lewis and C. Short, A Latin Dictionary, Oxford 1969, p. 198-199, and K.E. Georges and H. 
Georges, Ausführliches Lateinisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch Vol. I, 4th edition, Hannover 1976,  p. 703-
705. 
13 For instance, in Scaev. D. 19.21.52.3 and Ulp. D. 21.2.4 pr. See C.T. Lewis and C. Short, A Latin 
Dictionary, Oxford 1969, p. 199. 
14 See P.G.W. Glare, Oxford Latin Dictionary, Vol. I, Oxford 1968, p. 205 sub 12. 
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3. D. 9.2.44 pr. in Context 
When Ulpian wrote his famous line, it probably formed an integral part of a larger text. 
However, the text that has come down to us is rather short, it consists of two lines only. It 
may have been shortened by the compilers in the sixth century when they included it in 
the Digest, or perhaps this happened earlier.15 Yet, it was the glossators who divided the 
Digest texts into smaller sections and numbered them. In D. 9.2.44, they separated the 
first line from the second one and they called the second sentence section 1. The oldest 
manuscript of the Digest, the Codex Florentinus, shows that, originally, the two sentences 
were not separated, even by a space.16 In my view, it is only possible to understand the 
first sentence properly if we connect it again with the second one. D. 9.2.44 runs as 
follows: 
Ulpianus libro quadragensimo secundo ad Sabinum. In lege Aquilia et levissima culpa venit. (1) 
Quotiens sciente domino servus vulnerat vel occidit, Aquilia dominum teneri dubium non est.  
Ulpian in book 42 on Sabinus. Under the lex Aquilia, even the slightest degree of fault counts. (1) 
Whenever a slave wounds or kills with his master’s knowledge, the master is without doubt liable 
under the Aquilian law. 
The text deals with a case where a slave has killed or wounded someone else’s slave or 
animal and his master ‘knew’. Therefore, the legal question refers to the grey zone 
between the direct liability of a dominus iubens and the noxal liability of the master who 
did not know what his slave was about to do. According to Ulpian, the master is liable 
under the lex Aquilia. Making someone directly liable for a delict committed by his slave 
– only for ‘knowing’ – is rather a radical step. That is why Ulpian introduced his opinion 
by stating that, in connection with the lex Aquilia, even the slightest fault counts.  
 In modern Romanist literature, this opening sentence is regarded as giving a 
general rule: culpa levissima was sufficient for liability under the lex Aquilia; in other 
                                                  
15 Some Romanists have regarded the text as interpolated, for instance, V. Arangio-Ruiz, La responsabilità 
contrattuale in diritto romano, 2nd edition, Naples 1958, p. 232-234 and F.H. Lawson, Negligence in the 
Civil Law, Oxford 1950 (rpt. 1955), p. 40. 
16 See Justiniani Augusti pandectarum codex Florentinus I, A. Corbino and B. Santalucia (eds), Florence 
1988, p. 153v. 
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words, culpa levissima referred to iniuria of the delict damnum iniuria datum.17 This 
interpretation is not new, it dates from the time of the glossators.  
According to Hoffmann in his book on ‘Die Abstufung der Fahrlässigkeit in der 
Rechtsgeschichte’, the glossators used culpa levissima as a general criterion not only for 
liability under the lex Aquilia, but also under the law of contracts.18 They rejected the 
idea of liability without fault and, instead, developed a triple grade system of liability 
consisting of culpa lata, culpa levis and culpa levissima. The commentators followed in 
their wake, and so did the jurists of the usus modernus pandectarum. In the 18th century, 
the triple grade system was codified in the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht, but not in the 
later civil codes. There, a general concept of fault was used. Nevertheless, in modern 
legal practice, the concept of culpa levissima still turns up occasionally. Perhaps it is 
under the influence of this practice that the Romanists still regard liability for culpa 
levissima as a normal feature of classical Roman law. 
 However, the context of the sentence ‘In lege Aquilia et levissima culpa venit’ 
makes it clear that it was not meant to be a general rule. It refers to the second sentence of 
the text about the slave who killed someone else’s slave or quadruped, ‘sciente domino’, 
with the master’s knowledge.19 In the following text, the compilers answer the question 
of how this ‘knowing’ by the master has to be understood.  
D. 9.2.45 pr. 
Paulus libro decimo ad Sabinum. Scientiam hic pro patientia accipimus, ut qui prohibere potuit 
teneatur, si non fecerit.  
Paul in book 10 on Sabinus. We accept knowledge here as including sufferance, so that he who 
could have prevented harm is liable for not having done so. 
It is striking that Paul does not mention the lex Aquilia; however, it is very likely that he 
had this law in mind, for all the other texts in his tenth book on Sabinus are about 
questions in connection with the lex Aquilia.20 In D. 9.2.44, Ulpian applied the same 
                                                  
17 See above, note 1. A number of Romanists have argued that culpa levissima is used in a non-technical 
sense, for instance, Th. Mayer-Maly, Die Wiederkehr der culpa levissima, AcP 163 (1964), p. 124 with 
note 77. 
18 H.-J.Hoffmann, Die Abstufung der Fahrlässigkeit in der Rechtsgeschichte, Berlin 1968, p. 35-38. For the 
later development of culpa levissima, see the same, passim. 
19 In fact, the slave who intended to commit damnum iniuria datum had dolus. 
20 See O. Lenel, Palingenesia iuris civilis, Vol. I, Leipzig 1889 (rpt 1925), p. 1279-1280. 
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interpretation of scientia domini. In his reasoning, a master who knew the intentions of 
his slave and could stop him but did not do so was directly liable although his fault was 
very slight.  
In this text, the words culpa levissima do not refer to the person who committed the 
delict, that is, the slave. Therefore, they do not refer to iniuria in the wording of the lex 
Aquilia either. They indicate that the master’s fault consisted only of not preventing his 
slave from causing unlawful damage and that therefore the master’s fault could be 
qualified as ‘slightest’.   
 
4. Conclusion 
There is no doubt that, in D. 9.2.44, culpa is used in the technical sense of fault. 
However, it is used only in the context of scientia domini and only in this particular text 
by Ulpian. Therefore, there is no justification for making culpa levissima a general 
criterion for the lex Aquilia, nor is it possible to deduce from this text that it was only in 
the case of the lex Aquilia, that scientia domini led to direct liability and that in other 
delictual actions the ‘knowing’ master was only noxally liable. I think aequitas would 







In D. 9.2.44 pr., Ulpian states that, under the lex Aquilia, even the slightest fault 
(levissima culpa) counts. Since the time of the glossators, this phrase has been regarded 
as a general rule. Only one Romanist, MacCormack, has interpreted the phrase in a 
narrow sense: in his view, culpa levissima only referred to the case of scientia domini 
mentioned in section 1 of Ulpian’s text. Later, Gimenez-Candela has argued that scientia 
domini led to direct liability only in case of damnum iniuria datum. The author aims to 
prove that culpa levissima only referred to scientia domini but that, on the other hand, 
scientia domini led to direct liability in all delicts.  
